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Luca Barlassina (University of Sheffield) 
Valence: A reflection 
 




“He who laughs last has not yet heard the bad news.” 
― Bertolt Brecht 
 
There are many ways to refute a theory. Refutation by joke is the greatest of all. “Two 
behaviourists have just made love. One asks the other: ‘I know you liked it. Did I like it?’” The 
starting point of this short essay is another attempted refutation-by-joke. It concerns valence. 
What? Very simply, to say that an experience has valence is to say that it feels pleasant/good 
or unpleasant/bad. A number of experiences have valence: orgasms, happiness, and elation on 
the pleasant side; and pain, fear, and misery on the unpleasant one. Let’s call them ‘affective 
experiences.’ 
 
It goes without saying that affective experiences can be very different from one another—
having a toothache is one thing, being afraid of flying is quite another. Still, some have argued 
that there is something common to all of them: affective experiences are all (un)pleasant in the 
same way (Bramble 2013). Hence the joke: “If you feel the same pleasure when you smell flowers 
and when you have an orgasm, either tell me where you buy flowers or please do something 
about your sex life.” 
 
Did you laugh? If so, the joke might be on you. There are in fact good reasons to think that, 
despite appearances, valence might be a natural kind shared across the affective spectrum. 
Carruthers (2018) summarises them as follows. (1) Valence is underpinned by a single, domain-
general, neurobiological network, which is activated by different stimuli (e.g., sex and money), 
across different modalities (e.g., vision, touch, and imagination). (2) The same interventions 
(e.g., paracetamol) modify valence across different types of affective experience—e.g., physical 
and social pain. (3) If different affective experiences are (un)pleasant in the same way, we can 
use their valence to choose among them. Valence can thus work as a common currency to decide 
between, say, gustatory and intellectual pleasures.  
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If you, like me, take the hypothesis that valence is a natural kind seriously, then you, like me, 
might want to explain what this natural kind is. In other words, given that affective experiences 
are so different from one another, what makes it the case that they all feel (un)pleasant? This is 
the question I tackle here.  
 
Importantly, this question shouldn’t be read causally. I am not asking what types of stimulus 
bring about affective experiences. My concern is a metaphysical one—it has to do with the very 
nature of valence. You are God, and here is an experience that lacks valence. What should you 
add to it to turn it into an (un)pleasant experience? That’s the question, and there is nothing 
strange about it. If I ask you what water is, I am not asking you what brings about water. I am 
asking you what water consists of.  
 
Sometimes, similar questions require very different answers. The correct answer to ‘What is 
water?’ details its physical composition: two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen, connected by 
covalent bonds. Affective experiences are physical too—in my world, there are no gods, ghosts, 
or immaterial minds. But I am not sure that the answer to ‘What is valence?’ should be pitched 
at the physical level. I am old school. Every time I encounter a mental phenomenon, I hope it 
can be explained at the cognitive level—that is, in terms of what information it carries, how this 
information is encoded and stored, how it interacts with other bits of information, and so on.  
 
Luckily, I am not alone. In recent years, a number of philosophers have attempted to explain 
valence along these lines. The two most well-known approaches are world-directed 
evaluativism and world-directed imperativism. I want to convince you that they both fail. 
Should we then give up our search for a cognitive account of valence? Not at all. I have, in fact, 
a better alternative. It is called ‘reflexive imperativism.’  
 
A final note. The arguments that you see here against world-directed theories and in favour of 
reflexive imperativism—in fact, the idea of reflexive imperativism itself—have been developed 
together with my friend and colleague Max Khan Hayward. I honestly don’t recall which ideas 
are mine and which are Max’s. My heuristic is this: ‘good ideas are mine; mistakes are his.’ I 





World-directed theories: In memoriam  
Mental states have intentional, or semantic, content—they carry information; they “say” 
things. Some of them have world-directed content: they carry information about the non-mental 
world. My visual experience of an oak in the park is a case in point. Other mental states have 
instead mind-directed content. When I believe that you are happy, I am not representing the state 
of the park. I am representing the state of your mind.  
 
World-directed theories propose that: (i) affective experiences have a special type of world-
directed content; (ii) this world-directed content makes them (un)pleasant. What could this 
content be? One can find two main answers in the philosophical literature. 
 
The first one goes under the name of world-directed evaluativism (Bain 2013; Carruthers 2018; 
Cutter and Tye 2011). According to it: (i*) affective experiences represent worldly objects as 
being good/bad; (ii*) it is in virtue of this world-directed evaluative content that they are 
pleasant/unpleasant. A couple of examples should help. Abe is having a backache. His pain 
experience represents the condition of his back as bad. This is why his experience is unpleasant. 
Zoe is eating a cookie. Her gustatory experience represents the cookie as good. This is why her 
experience feels pleasant.  
 
Here are two arguments against this proposal.  
 
The sadist and the do-gooder  
Dr Do-Good is attending to a patient with a terrible injury on the neck. What a horrible 
sight! According to world-directed evaluativism, Dr Do-Good’s visual experience feels 
unpleasant because it represents the patient’s injury as bad. But this cannot be right. Dr 
Sadist is looking at the injury too, his visual experience also represents the injury as bad 
… but it feels so good.  
 
The Thinking Otherwise Problem 
You have eaten a hot pepper and now your mouth is on fire. Your experience is so 
unpleasant that you run to the fridge and chug a litre of milk directly from the bottle. 
The interesting thing is that you do so even though you know full-well that there is no 
damage in your mouth. But then the unpleasantness of your experience cannot be 
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identical to the world-directed evaluation There is a bad damage in my mouth. If it were, 
knowing that this evaluation is false should have prevented you from acting like that.  
 
Let’s consider whether the second account—world-directed imperativism (Martínez 2011)—fares 
better. Again, the idea is pretty simple: (i**) affective experiences command their subjects to do 
something about some worldly object; (ii**) it is in virtue of this world-directed imperative content 
that they are pleasant/unpleasant. So, Abe’s backache is unpleasant because it commands him 
Less of this damage in the back!, while eating a cookie gives Zoe pleasure since her experience has 
the content More of this cookie! 
 
Yet again, the idea won’t do:  
 
Hunger  
I am hungry. My hunger feels unpleasant. It feels so—world-directed imperativism 
says—because it commands me: More food! Fair enough, it is plausible that my hunger 
has such a content. But it cannot be the case that this content is what makes my hunger 
unpleasant. After all, if my hunger has that content, then all episodes of hunger have it 
… but not all episodes of hunger are unpleasant.  
 
A salty story 
Bilateral damage to the central nucleus of the amygdala does not impact rats’ hedonic 
responses to salt: their facial expressions indicate that they still experience pleasure in 
response to salty stimuli (Galaverna et al. 1993). This—world-directed imperativism 
says—means that these rats are tokening the command More salt! But this is false, since 
damage to the amygdala does abolish rats’ motivation to eat salt: they reject solutions 
containing more than 0.2% NaCl (Flynn et al. 1991). If anything, these rats are tokening 
the command Less salt! 
 
There are in fact two further arguments that show that any world-directed treatment of valence 
is doomed to fail.  
 
 World-undirected moods 
You wake up one day and you feel miserable. Your misery doesn’t command you to act 
upon the world a certain way, nor does it evaluate the state of world. In fact, it seems 
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that your experience isn’t about the world at all. Still, your experience is very 
unpleasant. Thus, valence doesn’t depend on world-directed content, be it imperative, 
evaluative, or whatever else.  
 
 Mind-directed motivations 
You have twisted your right ankle and now you are in pain. The unpleasantness of your 
experience has mind-directed motivational force: it motivates you to get rid of this very 
experience—you don’t want to feel like that. But then such an unpleasantness cannot 
reduce to contents like There is a bad damage in my right ankle/Less of the damage in my right 
ankle! Such contents can only motivate you against the state of your ankle, but they 




Becoming reflexive  
The attempt to explain valence in terms of world-directed content fails. But that’s not the only 
type of content. Maybe affective experiences feel (un)pleasant in virtue of having a certain type 
of mind-directed content. This is the proposal I endorse. More precisely, I maintain that your 
affective experience has valence in virtue of commanding you to do something about itself. In 
particular, a pleasant experience P has reflexive imperative content More of P!, while an 
unpleasant experience U has reflexive imperative content Less of U! Hence the name of the 
account: reflexive imperativism. In a nutshell, it says that an experience feels pleasant/unpleasant 
in virtue of commanding you More of me!/Less of me! (Barlassina under review; Barlassina and 
Hayward 2019; Barlassina and Hayward forthcoming). 
 
As always, examples should clarify the idea. Suppose that you are looking at a pen on your 
desk. Presumably, this visual experience is affectively neutral, that is, it feels neither good nor 
bad. This doesn’t mean that it lacks world-directed content. It in fact represents the pen as 
being on your desk. What it lacks is reflexive imperative content. And this is why it lacks valence 
too. If it had reflexive imperative content More of me!, it would be a pleasant visual experience. 
If it had reflexive imperative content Less of me!, it would be an unpleasant one. This is exactly 
the difference between Dr Do-Good and Dr Sadist’s visual experiences: even though they have 
the same world-directed content—they both represent the patient’s injury as bad—the former 
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has reflexive imperative content Less of me!, while the latter has reflexive imperative content 
More of me! This is why one feels bad and the other good.  
 
The fact that affective experiences command us to get more/less of themselves explains why 
they have mind-directed motivational force. When you twist your ankle, the unpleasantness of your 
pain commands you to get less of this experience, and so you don’t want to feel like that. By the 
same token, when you eat a cookie, your pleasant experience commands you to have more of 
itself, and this is why you want to have more of that gustatory pleasure.  
 
Oftentimes, these mind-directed motivations bring about world-directed motivations, i.e., 
motivations to change the state of the non-mental world. As we have just seen, the gustatory 
experience resulting from eating a cookie feels pleasant in virtue of having reflexive imperative 
content More of me! When this mind-directed command is sent to your decision-making system, 
the latter attempts to compute the best way to satisfy it. In this case, it is likely to hypothesise 
that the best course of action is to get another bite from the cookie. The corresponding world-
directed motivation is thus produced, and you end up munching the cookie (all else being equal, 
of course). The “hot pepper scenario” above is another case in point. The sensation you get 
from eating the hot pepper is unpleasant because it commands you Less of this sensation! Upon 
receiving this mind-directed command as input, your decision-making system outputs the 
world-directed motivation to drink some milk, and you decide to act accordingly. Your decision 
is not discounted in the light of your knowledge that your mouth is not damaged, since this 
decision has nothing to do with how your mouth is faring. You intend to drink milk because 
you think that it will lessen the unpleasant sensation you are having. Your goal is to fulfil the 
reflexive imperative content Less of this sensation! 
 
So far, I described the relation between world-directed motivations and mind-directed 
motivations as follows: one undergoes a pleasant/unpleasant experience; the experience’s 
valence commands one More of this experience!/Less of this experience!, thus motivating one for, or 
against, this very experience; this experience-directed motivation is then transformed into a 
world-directed one by the decision-making system. Things, however, are slightly more complex 
than that, for at least three reasons.  
 
First, on some occasions, the decision-making system doesn’t know how to satisfy the mind-
directed motivation it receives. You have been feeling miserable for months. You don’t want 
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to feel like that, and unsurprisingly so, given that the unpleasantness of your misery keeps on 
commanding you Less of this misery! You tried a number of behavioural strategies to satisfy this 
mind-directed command, but none of them worked. Now, your decision-making system has, 
so to speak, given up. As a result, you still feel unpleasant misery, you don’t want to feel like 
that, but this doesn’t result in any world-directed motivation.  
 
Second, the causal chain between mind-directed and world-directed motivations can be 
interrupted. This, I maintain, is what happened to the aforementioned amygdala-damaged 
rats. As you might remember, these rats find tasting salt pleasurable. According to reflexive 
imperativism, this means that they want more of that gustatory experience. This experience-
directed motivation, however, doesn’t bring about the world-directed motivation to ingest salt. 
Why so? Here’s why: interventions to the central nucleus of the amygdala have set up the rat’s 
decision-making system to constantly output the world-directed motivation not to eat any salt, 
regardless of the experience-directed motivation it receives as input.  
 
Third, and more importantly, you should not think that reflexive imperativism claims that 
world-directed motivations are typically causally dependent upon the mind-directed motivations 
associated to affective experiences. Fair enough, reflexive imperativism has it that affective 
experiences (better: their reflexive imperative contents) normally bring about world-directed 
motivations. But this is not to say that the majority of world-directed motivations are brought 
about by such experience-directed motivations. Quite the contrary, world-directed motivations 
are by and large causally independent from affective experiences. (Compare with this: skiing 
normally makes one thirsty, but the great majority of thirst episodes are not due to skiing). In 
this moment, for example, I am typing these words on my laptop, so my brain is issuing a 
number of motor commands. These world-directed commands and their world-directed 
motivational force, however, have nothing to do with my current affective experience. The 
same applies to hunger. As said above, hunger always commands one More food!, but this world-
directed command doesn’t have to be generated by an affective experience. Some episodes of 
hunger feel neither pleasant nor unpleasant—but they have world-directed motivational force 
nonetheless.  
 
This last point, of course, raises a very important question. If we are cognitive agents with a 
number of valence-independent, world-directed motivations, what is the point of having valence-
based, mind-directed motivations on the top of them? In Barlassina and Hayward (2019, p. 1039) we 
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formulated the problem as follows: “what is the evolutionary advantage of [valence]? […] Why 
do we need experiences that feel good or bad? Couldn’t nature just have endowed us with 
[world-directed] representations, desires, and affectless commands like the urge to defecate? 
Why did we need to suffer [or to feel pleasure]?” One year after, I am still puzzled by this question. 
So, I find myself in the following situation: I am pretty sure that affective experiences have 
valence in virtue of having reflexive imperative content More of me!/Less of me!, but I don’t know 
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